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Structure Compatibility and Restructuring in Judgment and Choice
MARCUS SELART
Go¨teborg University, Sweden
The use of different response modes has been found
to influence how subjects evaluate pairs of alterna-
tives described by two attributes. It has been sug-
gested that judgments and choices evoke different
kinds of cognitive processes, leading to an overweigh-
ing of the prominent attribute in choice (Tversky, Sat-
tath, & Slovic, 1988; Fischer & Hawkins, 1993). Four
experiments were conducted to compare alternative
cognitive explanations of this so-called prominence ef-
fect in judgment and choice. The explanations inves-
tigated were the structure compatibility hypothesis
and the restructuring hypothesis. According to the
structure compatibility hypothesis, it was assumed
that the prominence effect is due to a lack of compat-
ibility between the required output from subjects and
the structure of information in input. The restructur-
ing hypothesis stated that the decision maker uses
mental restructuring operations on a representation
of decision options to make the options more clearly
differentiated. In Experiment 1, a matching procedure
was used to provide pairs of equally attractive options
(medical treatments) for the following experiments. In
Experiments 2, 3, and 4, preferences were elicited with
two different response modes, choice and preference
rating. Value ranges on the prominent and nonpromi-
nent attributes were manipulated to test the structure
compatibility hypothesis. Accountability was also sub-
ject to manipulation as it was assumed to stimulate
restructuring. Since the prominence effect was not re-
stricted to choices, and effects of value ranges were
obtained but not of accountability, the results were
interpreted in line with the structure compatibility
hypothesis. © 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
The principle of procedure invariance is one of the
fundamental assumptions of normative decision
theory. It implies that equivalent ways of eliciting de-
cision makers’ preferences should result in similar out-
comes (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). However, proce-
dure invariance is often violated by preference rever-
sals (e.g., Slovic, Griffin, & Tversky, 1990; Slovic &
Lichtenstein, 1983, Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic, 1988;
see Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1992, for a review). A
preference reversal occurs whenever an individual pre-
fers one alternative in one procedure but shows the
opposite preference order in another. For example,
when subjects have to indicate which one of approxi-
mately equally attractive bets they prefer and how
much they would be willing to sell the bets for, they
often choose the high-probability option but indicate
the highest selling prize for the high-payoff option
(Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1983). Choosing between a pair
of gambles thus seems to involve different psychologi-
cal processes than bidding for each one separately.
When people are asked to choose between two bets,
they pay particular attention to the probability of win-
ning. When they are asked to set a price for how valu-
able the bet is, they look at how large the potential
payoffs are.
It has been shown in a riskless context that multi-
attribute options invoke different attention processes
in judgment and choice (Billings & Scherer, 1988;
Lindberg, Gärling, & Montgomery, 1989; Westenberg
& Koele, 1990, 1992). Specifically, response-mode bi-
ases have been found when subjects are asked to evalu-
ate pairs of decision alternatives whose consequences
are described by two attributes. Recently, Slovic et al.
(1990) and Tversky et al. (1988) demonstrated a judg-
ment-choice discrepancy, or riskless preference rever-
sal, in such a case. One of the attributes was selected to
be predominant or prominent. In choice tasks subjects
placed more weight on this attribute than they did in a
matching task in which they were required to make the
two options equally attractive. Subsequently, this
“prominence” effect has been replicated by Montgom-
ery, Gärling, Lindberg, and Selart (1990); Montgom-
ery, Selart, Gärling, and Lindberg (1994); and Selart,
Montgomery, Romanus, and Gärling (1994).
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The compatibility hypothesis has been proposed to
account for the prominence effect (Tversky et al., 1988;
Slovic et al., 1990; Fischer & Hawkins, 1993; Hawkins,
1994). According to this hypothesis, the effect reflects a
general principle of compatibility according to which
the processing of input (e.g., attributes describing op-
tions in a judgment or choice task) depends on how
compatible it is with the output (i.e., subjects’ re-
sponses). Tversky et al. (1988) argued that both risky
and riskless preference reversals are governed by
stimulus–response compatibility. Identical compo-
nents on both the stimulus and the response side en-
hance compatibility. Such components are the use of
the same scale units (e.g., grades, ranks), the direction
of relations (e.g., whether the correlations between in-
put and output variables are positive or negative), and
the numerical correspondence (e.g., similarity between
the input and output). The use of similar scale units
has been referred to as scale compatibility by Fischer
and Hawkins (1993) and Hawkins (1994). The frame-
work has also been used by Chapman and Johnson
(1994), who state that scale compatibility occurs if an
anchor and a preference judgment are expressed on the
same scale. According to Slovic et al. (1990), the theo-
retical motivations for scale compatibility are some-
what loose but its implications seem unambiguous.
However, scale compatibility cannot alone account
for the prominence effect (Hershey & Schoemaker,
1985; Schkade & Johnson, 1989; Slovic et al., 1990). It
may account for variations in strength of preference
found in different judgment modes, but in judgment–
choice comparisons this type of compatibility can yield
predictions directly opposed to the prominence effect
(Fischer & Hawkins, 1993). For instance, if dollar is
the prominent attribute, the scale-compatibility hy-
pothesis implies that people will attach greater weight
to money in a dollar-matching task than in choice.
In line with this criticism, Chapman and Johnson
(1995) state that it is not enough to consider only the
surface similarity of the response scale to one of the
features of the stimulus. The reason for this is that the
semantic categorizations of the involved objects (e.g.,
money vs health improvement) also must be considered
(see also Tversky, 1977).
Another recent explanation of the prominence effect
can also be related to the results of Tversky et al.
(1988). It states that the effect occurs because choice
and matching tasks evoke different types of decision
strategies which give different weight to the prominent
attribute. The qualitative response in choice is re-
garded as compatible with a lexicographic decision rule
which renders quantitative weighting of attributes un-
necessary. In contrast, quantitative judgments are
compatible with a quantitative weighting rule. This
form of compatibility is referred to as strategy compat-
ibility (Fischer & Hawkins, 1993; Hawkins 1994). The
cognitive basis of this is that the response mode is
priming the focus of attention on the compatible fea-
tures of the input. Nevertheless, the idea of strategy
compatibility has also proved to have weaknesses. For
instance, it has been shown that both choices as well as
several kinds of judgments evoke a prominence effect
(Fischer & Hawkins, 1993; Selart et al., 1994)
A different perspective on compatibility takes as its
point of departure the information structure of judg-
ments and decisions (Montgomery et al., 1994; Selart et
al., 1994, Selart, 1994a, 1994b). From this point of
view, it is assumed that the prominence effect is due to
a lack of compatibility between the required output
from subjects and the structure of information in input.
The general idea is that matching judgments can be
seen as distinct from preference rating judgments and
choices in that subjects have to evaluate one value dif-
ference relative to another to carry out the task. In
matching judgments, the task itself prevents the deci-
sion maker from using a lexicographic strategy, which
is not the case in choice and preference rating. This
depends on that subjects in the matching task have to
fill in a missing value in the matrix of inputs, whereas
the same value is given as an input in choice and pref-
erence rating. Thus, in matching judgments there is a
compatibility between input and output which is lack-
ing in choice and preference rating. On the basis of this
reasoning, a prominence effect is also expected for pref-
erence rating, due to the assumption that information
structure compatibility is salient for the selection of
strategy. This explanation is henceforth referred to as
structure compatibility.
The suggestion has also been made that the promi-
nence effect can be explained by a hypothesis based on
Montgomery’s (1983) theory of dominance structuring
in decision making. This hypothesis states that the de-
cision maker uses mental restructuring operations on a
representation of decision options to make the options
more clearly differentiated. These restructuring opera-
tions are parts of a fundamental cognitive process in
which humans apply operations to information to yield
a new problem representation (Payne, Bettman,
Coupey, & Johnson, 1992). In this theory, it is assumed
that subjects making choices restructure the available
information to make one option dominate the other(s).
Subjects may therefore increase value differences be-
tween options on important attributes and decrease
differences on unimportant attributes.
Similar assumptions have more recently been made
by Svenson (1992). In his differentiation and consoli-
dation theory, decision making is modeled as a process
in which one alternative gradually is differentiated
from another until the degree of differentiation is suf-
ficient for a decision. Thus, it is not sufficient to choose
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an alternative that is better. Rather, the preferred al-
ternative should be so much better than the nonpre-
ferred alternative that it remains better even under
unfavorable post-decision conditions.
If there are one prominent and one nonprominent
attribute, as a result of the restructuring process, the
former will have more influence since the differences
on that attribute are enlarged relative to the other.
More precisely, subjects may modify their beliefs or
values in such a way that there will be a larger dis-
crepancy between the options on the more important
attribute than on the less important attribute. Both
the importance order of the attributes and the differ-
ences between the alternatives on the attributes will
then speak in favor of a preference in line with the
prominent attribute. The above-mentioned modifica-
tions of beliefs and values are to be particularly fre-
quent in choice which is characterized by a conflict be-
tween alternatives. It is assumed that reasons or mo-
tives guide the modifications of values and beliefs.
Therefore, both Montgomery (1983) and Svenson
(1992) assume that the importance of a decision is di-
rectly related to the degree of restructuring.
EXPERIMENTAL HYPOTHESES
A prominence effect is predicted in both choice and
preference ratings according to the structure compat-
ibility hypothesis. The hypothesis can also be tested by
varying value differences between the options. Narrow
value ranges are supposed to decrease the effect in
both choices and preference ratings, whereas wide
ranges should increase it. This is because an informa-
tion structure characterized by narrow value ranges
between options may be assumed to invoke evaluations
of one attribute difference in relation to another as in
matching. Narrow value ranges are supposed to prime
a similar compensatory strategy, leading to a reduction
of the prominence effect. Wide value ranges should, on
the other hand, prime a noncompensatory strategy,
leading to the evaluation of primarily the difference on
the prominent attribute.
According to the restructuring hypothesis, a promi-
nence effect is predicted to occur in choice, as was as-
sumed in the former hypothesis. To further test the
restructuring hypothesis, it is proposed that account-
ability will increase restructuring in the choice condi-
tion (Simonson, 1989; Simonson & Nye, 1992; Tetlock,
1992). This is because justifying reasons for a choice
should influence modifications of values and beliefs.
Hence, a larger prominence effect is predicted for
choices of high accountability than for those of low ac-
countability. In line with this, other research suggests
that people cope with accountability by seeking out the
most acceptable position, which in a situation like this
would be synonymous with giving a higher weight to
the prominent attribute (Pruitt, 1981; Cialdini, Levy,
Herman, & Evenbeck, 1973). According to the struc-
ture compatibility hypothesis, the manipulation is
however not supposed to affect the prominence effect.
In Experiment 1, a matching procedure was used to
provide the stimulus material (medical treatments) for
the following experiments. In Experiments 2, 3, and 4,
preferences for the medical treatments were elicited
with two different response modes, choice and prefer-
ence rating. Two partly different manipulations of ac-
countability were used in these experiments. Value
range was varied as a between-subjects factor in Ex-
periment 2 and as a within-subject factor in Experi-
ments 3 and 4.
The choice of making between-group comparisons of
the initial matching task with the latter choice/
preference rating experiments was based on that Tver-
sky et al. (1988) used between-group comparisons of
matching and choice conditions as a basis for the ex-
planations of the prominence effect (strategy compat-
ibility, scale compatibility).
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Subjects. Forty undergraduate students at Göte-
borg University, equally as many men as women, par-
ticipated in return for payment. Ten subjects were ran-
domly assigned to each of four matching conditions so
that equally as many men as women performed four
different versions of the matching task.
Stimuli. The stimuli consisted of matching prob-
lems involving two medical treatments which only dif-
fered in effectiveness and pain relief. Effectiveness was
assumed to be the more important or prominent attrib-
ute. Values on both attributes were expressed on a
scale ranging from 0 (no effectiveness/pain relief) to
100 (full effectiveness/pain relief). Pairs of alternatives
were constructed by systematically varying the range
between the highest and lowest value on each attribute
in steps of 5, 10, 15, 20, or 25. For each range four
replicate pairs were prepared with the highest value on
each attribute varying in steps of 5 from 35 to 50 from
40 to 55, from 45 to 60, from 50 to 65, and from 55 to 70,
respectively. After having constructed the options in
this way, the values to be filled in were deleted as will
be described below. All the items are listed in the Ap-
pendix (Table A1).
Procedure. Subjects served in groups of approxi-
mately four at a time and were instructed to carry out
the task individually. All pairs of descriptions of treat-
ments were presented to them in a booklet. Ten ran-
dom orders were used equally often. On average the
matching tasks were completed in 15 min.
Subjects were asked to imagine that they were suf-
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fering from a disease. On the first page of the booklet,
the type-written instructions read as follows: “Suppose
you need medical treatment for a disease. There exist
two treatment programs which only differ in effective-
ness and pain-relief. The definition of effectiveness is
to what degree you will be fully recovered. The degrees
of effectiveness and pain-relief are expressed on a scale
ranging from 0 (no effectiveness/pain-relief) to 100 (full
effectiveness/pain-relief). Please evaluate the following
options.” On each following page of the booklet, a pair
of treatments were shown. For one of the treatments
one attribute value was missing. For instance,
Pain relief Effectiveness
Treatment A 60 45
Treatment B 45 ?
Subjects’ task was to provide the missing value so
that the options were experienced as equally attrac-
tive. In the example subjects thus indicated how effec-
tive Treatment B must be to appear equally attractive
as Treatment A. They were informed that the value
provided had to be equal to or higher (lower) than the
value for the other option on the same attribute.
In four different matching conditions varied as a be-
tween-subjects factor, the missing value was either the
highest or the lowest on the prominent attribute or the
highest or the lowest on the nonprominent attribute.
The pairs of treatments were presented in a matrix
with options as rows and attributes as columns. The
order of the attributes and options were in the different
conditions arranged in a way so that the missing value
always appeared in the lower right cell of the matrix.
Results and Discussion
The analyses of the results rested on the assumption
that
uP,p + uP,np = uNP,p + uNP,np, (1)
where uP,p and uP,np denote the attractiveness of the
levels of the prominent and nonprominent attributes
for the prominent option (with the highest value on the
prominent attribute), and uNP,p and uNP,np denote the
corresponding attractiveness of the levels of the promi-
nent and nonprominent attributes for the nonpromi-
nent option. If the objective attribute levels are de-
noted x and it is assumed that ui,j 4 wjxi,j with wj
denoting the attribute weights, then by substitution in
Eq. (1):
wp/wnp = ~xNP,np 1 xP,np!/~xP,p 1 xNP,p!. (2)
Based on Eq. (2), the weight ratios were determined
for individual subjects’ matching values. In these com-
putations, 6.0% of all observations were excluded be-
cause subjects provided a matching value which re-
sulted in a range which was 0. The mean weight ratios
ranging between .83 and 3.73 for the different match-
ing conditions and value ranges with an overall mean
of 1.89 indicated that effectiveness was a more impor-
tant attribute than pain-relief. A 4 (matching condi-
tion) × 5 (value range) ANOVA with repeated mea-
sures on the last factor yielded no reliable effects of
value range. The construction of the stimuli for the
following experiments was accordingly based on the
overall mean weight ratio.
EXPERIMENT 2
Method
A way of testing the prominence effect is to create a
set of problems so that subjects can either choose or
rate their preference for pairs of options which have
been matched to be equally attractive (Montgomery et
al., 1994).
Subjects. Eighty undergraduate students at Göte-
borg, University, equally as many men as women, par-
ticipated in return for payment. Five men and five
women were randomly assigned to each of the eight
conditions. Subjects were run in groups of four in an
order which was counterbalanced.
Stimuli. Pairs of descriptions of medical treat-
ments were constructed as follows. In one set of pairs
the value ranges on the prominent attribute was 5
(narrow value ranges); in another set, they were 40
(wide value ranges). A value range on the nonpromi-
nent attribute was for each treatment pair obtained by
first multiplying the value range on the prominent at-
tribute with the mean weight ratio obtained from the
matching task in Experiment 1. Using a similar proce-
dure as Tversky et al. (1988), the resulting value range
was then increased by 1 to make the nonprominent
option appear more attractive than the prominent op-
tion. Twenty pairs of options were created for narrow
and wide value ranges. In both conditions, the attrib-
ute levels of the prominent option on the prominent
attribute varied in steps of 1 from 41 to 60. Each option
was presented on a single page. Two examples of each
are given in Table 1.
Procedure. Preferences were elicited with choice
and preference rating. In the choice response mode,
subjects made 20 choices between the pairs of treat-
ments. The type-written instructions were the same as
in the matching task except that subjects were asked to
choose between the options. Subjects indicated which
treatment they would choose.
The descriptions were presented pairwise in the
preference-rating condition like they were in the choice
condition. In this response mode, subjects rated each
option in the pairs on a scale ranging from 0, defined as
very poor, to 100, defined as very good. Subjects were
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instructed that they were allowed to use any value on
the scale to indicate their preference.
Accountability was manipulated through task in-
structions in a way similar to that in previous studies
(Simonson, 1989; Simonson & Nye, 1992; Tetlock,
1983). In the low accountability condition, subjects
were told that their responses would remain totally
confidential. In contrast, subjects were in the high ac-
countability condition told that the material they pro-
vided by their responses would be included in a booklet
and subject to future class discussions. They were
therefore asked to explain and justify their judgments
or choices. After having completed all choices/ratings,
subjects were allowed to review their responses and
then write down their explanations and justifications.
Without having been told in advance, subjects in the
low-accountability condition were asked to do the
same.
Subjects participated individually in sessions lasting
for about 40 minutes. They were randomly assigned to
one of eight conditions according to a 2 (response mode)
× 2 (accountability) × 2 (value range) factorial design.
The order of the choice problems was randomized.
Across subjects the orders of prominent/nonprominent
attri bute and option were counterbalanced.
Results and Discussion
Choices and preference ratings were scored equiva-
lently. A score of 1 was assigned if the prominent op-
tion in a pair was chosen or given the highest prefer-
ence rating. If both options received the same prefer-
ence rating, a score of 0.5 was assigned. As indicated by
the fact that the mean response scores were reliably
larger than .50 in all conditions, a prominence effect
was uniformly obtained. The weakest effect was ob-
tained for preference ratings of options with narrow
value ranges, (p < .01).
A 2 (response mode) × 2 (accountability) × 2 (value
range) ANOVA indicated that the prominence effect
was reliably weaker when the value range was narrow
than when it was wide, F(1,72)4 5.68, p < .05 (Fig. 1).
In addition the interaction with response mode was
significant, F(1,72) 4 4.48, p < .05. Tukey post hoc
tests revealed that the response scores for wide value
ranges differed significantly from the scores from nar-
row value ranges only when subjects were making pref-
erence ratings.
There were no main or interaction effects of account-
ability. However, the interaction between response
mode and accountability was marginally significant, F
(1,72) 4 2.82, p < .10 (Fig. 2).
In order to determine whether there were differences
in restructuring in the different conditions, subjects’
written explanations/justifications were treated simi-
larly as think-aloud data in previous studies (Mont-
gomery et al., 1994; Selart et al., 1994). Briefly, the
written explanations/justifications were first parti-
tioned into statements which normally corresponded to
a sentence. Second, each statement was coded with re-
spect to (i) which of the attributes, if any, it referred to,
and (ii) whether it was positive, negative, or neutral. A
statement in which the subject compared the attrac-
tiveness of both attributes was coded as a positive
evaluation of the preferred and a negative evaluation
of the nonpreferred attribute. The reliability of the cod-
ing was satisfactory as indicated by an 85% agreement
for a randomly chosen 10% of all statements which
were coded by an additional judge.
Since the justifications and explanations took part
after the judgments or choices, subjects did not refer to
specified alternatives or attribute levels. Rather, they
expressed their explanations/justifications in terms
which could be interpreted as positive or negative
evaluations of the attributes. Hence, only evaluation of
TABLE 1
Examples of Stimuli Used in Experiments 2 and 3
Value Prominent Nonprominent
ranges Options attribute attribute
Narrow Treatment A 41a 36
Treatment B 36 46
Narrow Treatment A 42 37
Treatment B 37 47
Wide Treatment A 41 1
Treatment B 1 78
Wide Treatment A 42 2
Treatment B 2 79
a The values of the prominent and the nonprominent attributes
are expressed on a scale ranging from 0 (very low) to 100 (very high).
FIG. 1. Mean response scores as function of response mode and
value ranges in Experiment 2.
MARCUS SELART110
JOBNAME: OB 65#2 96 PAGE: 6 SESS: 3 OUTPUT: Wed Jun 12 14:17:58 1996
/xypage/worksmart/tsp000/67769j/20pu
attributes were coded. The mean number of times the
prominent and nonprominent attributes were posi-
tively and negatively evaluated without any reference
to alternatives or attribute levels are given in Table 2.
As revealed by a 2 (response mode) × 2 (accountability)
× 2 (value range) by 2 (attribute) ANOVA with re-
peated measures on the last factor, the prominent at-
tribute received a significantly higher evaluation than
the nonprominent attribute, F(1, 72)4 55.11, p < .001.
Furthermore, both attributes received higher evalua-
tions in preference ratings than in choices F(1, 72) 4
4.39, p < .05. This tendency was most pronounced in
the case of low accountability as substantiated by an
interaction between response mode and accountability,
F(1, 72) 4 4.39, p < .05.
Since evaluations of attribute levels could not be
coded, the analyses do not provide a proper test of the
restructuring hypothesis in this respect. However, a
more abstract notion of restructuring could be tested
that has been labeled restructuring by differentiation
through attribute importance (Svenson, 1992). Sub-
jects do not only restructure by changing the positions
of attribute levels, but they may also restructure the
importance of a whole attribute.
In summary, there was no clear evidence indicating
that accountability affected the prominence effect. Nei-
ther did the results indicate that accountability leads
to more restructuring. It may be the case that the ac-
countability manipulation was too weak.
EXPERIMENT 3
Method
In this experiment an attempt was made to increase
the impact of the accountability manipulation by ask-
ing subjects to justify their responses each time after
having made them. This form of accountability ma-
nipulation has been used in previous research (Simon-
son & Nye, 1992) and has in itself been able to produce
a higher level of accountability even without the ex-
plicit information that the choices/ratings would be
evaluated.
Subjects. Forty undergraduate students at Göte-
borg University, equally as many men as women, par-
ticipated in return for payment. Five men and five
women were randomly assigned to each of the four con-
ditions.
Stimuli. The stimuli were a subset of those in Ex-
periment 2. Ten pairs of treatments were taken from
the set of treatments with wide value ranges and an-
other ten from the set with narrow value ranges. Ac-
cordingly, value range was treated as a within-subject
factor. The orders of prominent/nonprominent attri-
bute and option were counterbalanced across options
for each subject.
Procedure. The procedure was identical to that in
Experiment 2, except that accountability was manipu-
lated differently. As in Experiment 2, subjects in the
low-accountability condition were instructed that their
responses would remain totally confidential, whereas
in the high-accountability condition, subjects were in-
structed that their choices would be included in a book-
let to be used as a basis for further class discussions.
In contrast to Experiment 2, subjects in the high-
accountability condition were asked to explain and jus-
tify in a written statement each choice or pair of pref-
erence ratings immediately after elicitation. No expla-
nations/justifications were required from subjects in
the low-accountability condition.
Results and Discussion
The same scoring procedure was used as in Experi-
ment 2. Since the mean response scores were reliably
larger than .50 in all conditions, a prominence effect
was again uniformly obtained. The weakest effect was
obtained for choices between options with low account-
ability, (p < .01). A 2 (response mode) × 2 (accountabil-
ity) × 2 (value range) ANOVA with repeated measures
FIG. 2. Mean response scores as function of response mode and
accountability in Experiment 2.
TABLE 2
Mean Evaluations of Attributes in Experiment 2
Choice Preference rating
Condition PAa NPAb PA NPA
Low accountability
Narrow value range 1.10 −0.70 1.60 0.20
Wide value range 1.70 −0.90 2.00 −0.20
High accountability
Narrow value range 1.50 −0.40 1.30 −0.70
Wide value range 1.30 −0.60 1.50 −0.30
a Prominent attribute.
b Nonprominent attribute.
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on the last factor indicated, like that in Experiment 2,
that the prominence effect was reliably smaller when
the value range was narrow than when it was wide,
F(1, 36) 4 5.00, p < .05 (Fig. 3). However, neither the
main nor the interaction effect of accountability
reached significance (Fig. 4). In a second analysis all
responses in the high accountability condition that
were not accompanied by verbal explanation or justifi-
cation were deleted. Nevertheless, this did not result in
significant effects of accountability, and the main effect
of value range persisted as was revealed by an ANOVA
based on the remaining justified responses F(1, 36) 4
6.31, p < .05.
The analysis of the explanations/justifications fol-
lowed the same procedure as in Experiment 2. How-
ever, it had to be limited to high-accountability sub-
jects. One of the subjects was missing because he or she
only partially produced explanations and justifica-
tions. The means of positive and negative statements
which referred to attributes are given in Table 3. As
revealed by a 2 (response mode) × 2 (attribute) × 2
(value range) ANOVA with repeated measures on the
last two factors, the prominent attribute received sig-
nificantly higher evaluations than the nonprominent
attribute, F(1, 17) 4 27.31, p < .001.
EXPERIMENT 4
Method
In this experiment, another attempt was made to
increase the impact of the accountability manipulation
by instructing subjects to justify and explain their
evaluations as if they were physicians. Simonson and
Nye (1992) found that accountability affected the
prominence effect only if selection of the normatively
correct option was easier to justify. Previous research
have suggested that accountability may be regarded as
inherent in the role of clinical professionals (Green-
blatt, 1991; O’Neill, 1989). By letting accountable sub-
jects evaluate the options as physicians should there-
fore further increase the normatively correct appear-
ance of the prominent option.
Subjects. Forty-eight undergraduate students at
Göteborg University, equally as many men as women,
participated in return for payment. Six men and six
women were randomly assigned to each of the four con-
ditions.
Stimuli. The stimuli were the same as those used
in Experiments 2 and 3, with two exceptions. First,
both high and low accountability subjects were in-
structed to take the role of the physician in making
their judgments and decisions. Second, as in the former
experiments, a value range on the nonprominent at-
tribute was obtained for each treatment pair by first
multiplying the value range on the prominent attribute
with the mean weight ratio obtained from the match-
ing task in Experiment 1. The resulting value range
was increased by 5 to make the nonprominent option
appear even more attractive (Table 4). Value ranges
were treated as a within-subject factor as in Experi-
FIG. 3. Mean response scores as function of response mode and
value ranges in Experiment 3.
FIG. 4. Mean response scores as function of response mode and
accountability in Experiment 3.
TABLE 3
Mean Evaluations of Attributes in Experiment 3
Choice Preference rating
Value Prominent Nonprominent Prominent Nonprominent
ranges attribute attribute attribute attribute
Narrow 2.10 −1.50 1.11 −1.11
Wide 2.70 −2.70 1.44 −1.33
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ment 3. The orders of prominent/nonprominent attrib-
ute and option were counterbalanced across options for
each subject.
Procedure. The procedure was identical to that in
Experiment 3. Subjects in the low-accountability con-
dition were instructed that their responses would re-
main totally confidential, whereas in the high-
accountability condition, subjects were instructed that
their choices would be included in a booklet to be used
as a basis for further class discussions. Subjects in the
high-accountability condition were asked to explain
and justify, in a written statement, each choice or pair
of preference ratings immediately after elicitation. No
explanations/justifications were required from subjects
in the low-accountability condition.
Results and Discussion
The same scoring procedure was used as in Experi-
ments 2 and 3. The mean response scores were reliably
larger than .50 in a majority of the conditions. The
weakest effect was obtained for choices between op-
tions with high accountability (p < .01). A lack of a
prominence effect was found for choices between op-
tions with narrow value ranges. A 2 (response mode) ×
2 (accountability) × 2 (value range) ANOVA with re-
peated measures on the last factor indicated, like those
in Experiments 2 and 3, that the prominence effect was
reliably smaller when the value range was narrow
than when it was wide, F(1, 44)4 25.82, p < .0001 (Fig.
5). Furthermore, a reliable interaction effect between
response mode and value range was obtained, F(1, 44)
4 4.42, p < .05. However, neither the main nor the
interaction effect of accountability reached significance
(Fig. 6). In a subsequent analysis, all responses in the
high-accountability condition that were not accompa-
nied by verbal explanation or justification were de-
leted. Nevertheless, this did not result in any signifi-
cant effects of accountability, and the main effect of
value range persisted as was revealed by an ANOVA
based on the remaining justified responses, F(1, 44)4
4.86, p < .05.
The analyses of the data obtained from high account-
ability subjects’ explanations/justifications followed
the same procedure as in Experiment 3. Table 5 shows
the means of positive and negative statements which
referred to the attributes. A 2 (response mode) × 2 (at-
tribute) × 2 (value range) ANOVA with repeated mea-
sures on the last two factors did not yield any main
effects. However, a reliable interaction between attri-
bute and value range was obtained, F(1, 22) 4 5.12, p
< .05. The prominent attribute was more positively
evaluated for options with wide value ranges, whereas
the nonprominent attribute was more positively evalu-
ated for options with narrow value ranges.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The structure compatibility hypothesis made three
predictions. First, it predicted a prominence effect in
both choice and preference rating judgment. As re-
vealed by previous research (Fischer & Hawkins, 1993;
Montgomery et al., 1994; Selart et al., 1994), an effect
was found also for preference ratings. In these studies,
a large variety of problems were used. The present
finding therefore supported the notion of the generality
of the effect and suggests that, for instance, strategy
compatibility between input and output information
cannot alone account for the effect. The power of the
effect was revealed in that the attempts to eliminate
preferences in line with the effect proved to be unsuc-
cessful.
The explanation for this is, according to the struc-
ture compatibility hypothesis, that the required output
from subjects needs to be compatible with the structure
TABLE 4
Examples of Stimuli Used in Experiment 4
Value Prominent Nonprominent
ranges Options attribute attribute
Narrow Treatment A 41a 36
Treatment B 36 50
Narrow Treatment A 42 37
Treatment B 37 51
Wide Treatment A 41 1
Treatment B 1 82
Wide Treatment A 42 2
Treatment B 2 83
a The values on the prominent and nonprominent attributes are
expressed on a scale ranging from 1 (very low) to 100 (very high).
FIG. 5. Mean response scores as function of response mode and
value ranges in Experiment 4.
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of information in input. In a matching task, there is an
agreement between input and the required output.
Subjects are required to match one value difference
(required output) to another difference which is given
in the task (input). Hence, there exists a dimensional
compatibility between input and output. If the differ-
ence between attribute levels of the prominent attri-
bute serves as input, then the difference between the
levels on the nonprominent attribute serves as the re-
quired output and vice versa. This form of compatibil-
ity involves transforming and rearranging, since both
differences always have to be taken into account.
In choices and preference ratings, on the other hand,
both differences serve as input. For example, in a two
options by two attributes choice task, the input is built
on four pieces of information (the attribute levels of
each alternative), whereas the output corresponds to a
preference order between alternatives. Here, there is
no dimensional compatibility between input and out-
put. Subjects therefore do not transform andrearrange
the information to the same extent, simply because
they are not forced to do it. The information structure
of these tasks gives them the opportunity to select a
lexicographic strategy.
Recent findings suggest that decision strategies are
influenced by the organization of individual items of
information into structures (Schkade & Kleinmuntz,
1994). It is further assumed that organization as a fea-
ture of information strongly influences information ac-
quisition. For instance, presenting the stimulus on a
screen by alternative or by attribute has been shown to
strongly influence information acquisition. Hence,
similar task demands in both choice and preference
rating (the lack of structure compatibility) can be seen
as representing a common organization principle
which is different from the one used in matching.
However, in Experiment 4, there was no prominence
effect revealed in the choice condition for narrow value
ranges. In line with this, the analyses of high-
accountability subjects’ explanations/justifications
showed that the evaluation of the prominent attribute
for this condition was slightly negative, which was not
the case in the other experiments. This must neverthe-
less be regarded as a special case since the nonpromi-
nent option was made heavily dominant in a situation
of great conflict (narrow value ranges).
Second, the structure compatibility hypothesis pre-
dicted that narrow value ranges should decrease the
effect in both choice and preference ratings, whereas
wide value ranges should increase it in both response
modes. The rationale behind this prediction was that
narrow value ranges should to a higher extent force the
subjects to take all the attribute levels into account as
in the matching task. As suggested by the hypothesis,
reliable main effects of value range in the predicted
direction were generally obtained.
Therefore, it seems plausible to assume that the in-
creased prominence effect due to wide value ranges can
be attributed to the same principle as in choice and
preference rating. This form of compatibility explana-
tion suggests that wide value ranges make subjects to
a higher extent use a lexicographic strategy, that is,
they overweight the prominent attribute.
An alternative interpretation of the obtained results
is that the value range effect could be explained by an
additive model. This explanation is based on that the
utility values of the treatments which are narrow in
range are more similar than the values of those treat-
ments which are wide in range. However, two objec-
tions can be raised against this latter suggestion: (a) A
prominence effect was obtained also when value ranges
were narrow, despite that the utility values were more
similar in this condition. (b) An additive model predict-
ing a prominence effect due to wide ranges should also
assume an overweighting of the prominent attribute in
the matching task, due to these ranges. No such an
effect was obtained.
Third, the structure compatibility hypothesis pre-
dicted that accountability was supposed to neither in-
crease nor decrease the effect in choice. In line with the
prediction, no reliable main effects of accountability
FIG. 6. Mean response scores as function of response mode and
accountability in Experiment 4.
TABLE 5
Mean Evaluations of Attributes in Experiment 4
Choice Preference rating
Value Prominent Nonprominent Prominent Nonprominent
ranges attribute attribute attribute attribute
Narrow −0.33 1.08 1.33 −1.25
Wide 1.50 −1.42 1.33 −0.83
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were found in the experiments, despite the reported
tendencies.
Restructuring operations, on the other hand, imply a
usage of different kinds of operations, such as bolster-
ing the advantages or deemphasizing the disadvan-
tages of a promising option. Thus, the restructuring
hypothesis predicted a larger prominence effect for
high accountability choices than for low accountability
choices. However, the results revealed that the ac-
countability manipulations did not reach significance
in any of the experiments. There are several possible
explanations for this. One is that the manipulations
were too weak. Another builds on the results of
Simonson and Nye (1993). They found that high ac-
countability leads to an enhanced prominence effect,
but that low accountability also could lead to such an
enhancement if the rational alternative appeared easy
to explain and justify. In Experiment 2, the promi-
nence effect in choice was slightly increased in the low-
accountability condition as compared to the high-
accountability condition. A possibility is that the ratio-
nal alternative in the present study was easy to explain
and justify, and that subjects therefore did not restruc-
ture in the high-accountability condition. People in this
situation might cope with accountability by thinking in
more multidimensional ways that damage the process
of restructuring. According to this interpretation, sub-
jects treat the attributes as compensatory, that is, a
high value on one attribute might compensate for a low
value on another. In line with this, other research has
shown that accountability may lead to an increased
willingness to pay attention to information, to reduced
overattribution effects, and also to reduced overconfi-
dence effects (Hagafors & Brehmer, 1983; Tetlock,
1983; Tetlock, 1985).
In Experiment 3, an alternative accountability in-
struction was used in which subjects in the high-
accountability condition were instructed to justify and
explain each response during the session. This ma-
nipulation was similar to that used in previous re-
search by Simonson and Nye (1992). They found that
subjects who justified their choices immediately after
having made them were significantly less likely to ex-
hibit a judgmental error, such as the prominence effect.
However, in the present experiment, this was not
found.
In Experiment 4, an attempt was made to further
increase the impact of the accountability manipulation
by instructing subjects to justify and explain their
evaluations as if they were physicians. Previous re-
search has suggested that accountability may be re-
garded as inherent in the role of clinical professionals
(Greenblatt, 1991; O’Neill, 1989). Nevertheless, this
form of manipulation did not have any impact on the
prominence effect.
It seems clear that the role of value ranges and ac-
countability in judgment and choice is a topic that
needs further investigation. Although we did not find
any reliable effects of our accountability manipula-
tions, the results suggest that the impact of account-
ability depends not only on the stimuli being used (Si-
monson & Nye, 1992) but also on how the manipula-
tions themselves interplay with subjects’ need to
justify.
APPENDIX
TABLE A1
Stimuli for Experiment 1
Value ranges
Pair 05 10 15 20 25
1. X1 30 30 35 X1 30 30 40 X1 30 30 45 X1 30 30 50 X1 30 30 55
2. 35 X2 30 35 40 X2 30 40 45 X2 30 45 50 X2 30 50 55 X2 30 55
3. 35 30 X3 35 40 30 X3 40 45 30 X3 45 50 30 X3 50 55 30 X3 55
4. 35 30 30 X4 40 30 30 X4 45 30 30 X4 50 30 30 X4 55 30 30 X4
5. X1 35 35 40 X1 35 35 45 X1 35 35 50 X1 35 35 55 X1 35 35 60
6. 40 X2 35 40 45 X2 35 45 50 X2 35 50 55 X2 35 55 60 X2 35 60
7. 40 35 X3 40 45 35 X3 45 50 35 X3 50 55 35 X3 55 60 35 X3 60
8. 40 35 35 X4 45 35 35 X4 50 35 35 X4 55 35 35 X4 60 35 35 X4
9. X1 40 40 45 X1 40 40 50 X1 40 40 55 X1 40 40 60 X1 40 40 65
10. 45 X2 40 45 50 X2 40 50 55 X2 40 55 60 X2 40 60 65 X2 40 65
11. 45 40 X3 45 50 40 X3 50 55 40 X3 55 60 40 X3 60 65 40 X3 65
12. 45 40 40 X4 50 40 40 X4 55 40 40 X4 60 40 40 X4 65 40 40 X4
13. X1 45 45 50 X1 45 45 55 X1 45 45 60 X1 45 45 65 X1 45 45 70
14. 50 X2 45 50 55 X2 45 55 60 X2 45 60 65 X2 45 65 70 X2 45 70
15. 50 45 X3 50 55 45 X3 55 60 45 X3 60 65 45 X3 65 70 45 X3 70
16. 50 45 45 X4 55 45 45 X4 60 45 45 X4 65 45 45 X4 70 45 45 X4
Note. X1, Highest value on the prominent attribute missing; X2, lowest value on the prominent attribute missing; X3, lowest value on the
nonprominent attribute missing; X4, highest value on the nonprominent attribute missing.
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